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In his memoirs, general Sefer Halilović pays considerable attention to his 
part in preparing for Bosnian war during the winter of 1991-1992. Halilović 
organized and led the PL (Patriotic League), a paramilitary organization asso-
ciated with the SDA (Stranka demokratske akcije – political party organized 
and led by Alija Izetbegović). The PL formed the core of the ABH (Army of 
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina), and Halilović therefore became the 
first commander of Bosnian Muslims’ armed forces in the summer of 1992.1
In the appendices to his memoirs, Halilović even included two documents 
pertaining to the SDA’s preparations for war in late 1991 and early 1992.2  In 
the first of these documents, would be general enumerated various tasks to be 
completed before the onset of war, including the creation of a military organi-
zation and the identification of Bosnian communities according to their eth-
nic makeup.  “The ethnic structures of villages, local communities, urban and 
suburban neighborhoods are to be marked on maps,” the documents reads, 
“(Muslim and Croatian villages — full green circle, with a letter H adjoining 
Croatian villages, Serbian villages — blue circle)”. 3  In the second document, 
which is dated 25 Feb 92 — almost two months before large scale fighting 
broke out — Halilović defined the aim of the paramilitary organization he 
had just formed as protection of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Muslim population. 
“The basic task of the forces of the PL of BiH,” he wrote, “is the protection of 
the Muslim people, [and the] preservation of [the] integrity and wholeness of 
BiH.”
These two documents, written by the leader of the PL and the future com-
mander of the ABH, illustrate the mentality that shaped the way that Bosnia’s 
Muslims prepared for and waged war. When the first document was written 
in 1991, the full outbreak of hostilities was still several months away, but the 
Patriotic League was clearly preparing for an ethnic conflict, given Halilović’s 
order to categorize settlements according to ethnic criteria. His assumption 
1 Sefer HALILOVIĆ, Lukava strategija (The Clever Strategy), Sarajevo 1997, passim.
2 S. HALILOVIĆ, ibid., pp. 165-167.
3 The document was dated by the author as having been written “at the end of the 1991”.
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that most settlements in BiH could be defined according to ethnic criteria 
reflected the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s population into compact ethnic 
groups. But this assumption was also based on the other one, that these groups 
tended to live separately in a “tacit segregation” in rural settlements and urban 
neighborhoods, where each group displayed symbols and practiced customs 
characteristic of their ethnic and religious affiliations.4  In such a culture, few 
embraced the concept of a liberal, “civil” society favored by current Western 
European leaders. In early 1992, before the outbreak of war, and long before 
the conflict between Croats and Muslims, it was natural for Halilović to con-
ceive of the “protection of [the] integrity and wholeness of BiH” not as the 
“protection of citizens of BiH”, nor even of the “victims of aggression”, but as 
protection of the “Muslim people.” Although there was a nationality implied, 
at the time the document was created, Bosnia’s Muslims were officially clas-
sified only by religion, as “Muslims,” not as “Bosniaks,” a term that implies an 
ethnic identity that is territorial.5
It is possible that Halilović was exceptional in his bias, but it is more likely 
that he was a typical product of Bosnian society. Before he became active in 
the organization of the SDA’s paramilitary “Patriotic league,” he was a profes-
sional officer in the JNA with the rank of major.6 So he was educated at mili-
tary schools where he acquired a particular view of the world that should have 
predisposed him to adopt an ethnically neutral “Yugoslav” identity. But he did 
not do so; he saw himself as Muslim, just as general Ratko Mladić identified 
himself as a Serb and general Slobodan Praljak as a Croat. Halilović’s profes-
sional training shaped his military decisions, but his ethnic identity overrode 
the indoctrination he received in the JNA, just as it did for other Muslims, and 
for most Croats and Serbs. Indeed, his projections regarding war in Bosnia 
as an ethnic conflict appear to have coincided with the views of the Muslim 
people and their political leaders.7
With the exception of the ABH, the inclusion of national references in the 
names of the military organizations that were formed on the territory of BiH 
in 1992 showed the tendency to construe the function of such organizations 
as narrowly ethnic. 8 Indeed, although its name did not implie an ethnically 
4 For a discussion of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s population over the past hundred years, see Franjo 
MARIĆ, Pregled pučanstva Bosne i Hercegovine izmedju 1879. i 1995. godine, Zagreb, Katehetski 
Salezijanski Centar, 1996., passim.
5 For a discussion of efforts to define and create of a Muslim nationality in Yugoslavia 
during the 1960s and 1970s, see Wolfgang HÖPKEN, “Yugoslavia’s Communists and the 
Bosnian Muslims,” in Andreas KAPPELER, Gerhard SIMON, Georg BRUNNER, and Edward 
ALLWORTH, eds., Muslim Communities Reemerge. Historical Perspectives on Nationality 
Politics, and Opposition in the Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, Durham: Duke UP, 1994.
6 The acronym “JNA” stands for “Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija” (Yugoslav National or 
People’s Army).
7 See discussion of the history and attitudes of the Muslims of Bosnia, especially the evolution 
of the JMO and the formation of a Muslim ‘nationality’ during the twentieth century in Enver 
REDŽIĆ, Sto godina muslimanske politike u tezama i kontroverzama istorijske nauke (Hundred 
years of Muslim policy in the thesis and controversies of scholars), Sarajevo 2000.
8 The Croatian militia was named “Hrvatsko vijeće obrane - HVO” (Croatian Defense 
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oriented organization, like the other armed forces in Bosnia, the ABH was also 
dominated by a single nationality and formed to protect the members and 
interests of a particular ethnic group – Bosnia’s Muslims. That the authorities 
in Sarajevo decided to call their military forces the Army of the Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and not the “Bosniak” or “Muslim” Army, was politi-
cally necessary to win over public opinion abroad and reflected the belief 
held by Halilović and SDA leaders that to protect the “Muslim people” was to 
preserve  the “integrity and wholeness of BiH.” The Bosnian Muslim politi-
cal elite saw its religious/ethnic group as the dominant nationality in Bosnia, 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina as their state, in the same way that the Croatians 
saw Croatia as their homeland and the Serbs saw Serbia as their fatherland. 
Indeed, the Muslims seem to have viewed themselves as a “core” Bosnian 
people in much the same way that the Serbs had viewed themselves as a “core” 
Yugoslav people, and this was clearly a major reason for their differences with 
the region’s other ethnic groups. Friction with other ethnic groups was to be 
expected, given that in the former Yugoslavia a similar assumption of domi-
nance by the Serbs had also generated problems with other ethnic groups, 
including the Muslims.9
So the political and military leaders of the Bosnian Muslims were not more 
tolerant nor more ethnically open than members of other ethnic communities 
in the former Yugoslavia. Nor was this surprising. It would have been surpris-
ing had the Bosnian Muslim leaders held different general views from their 
Croat and Serb neighbors and the average Bosnian Muslim. It is problematic 
to what extent Alija Izetbegović’s writings and growing support for Islamic 
fundamentalism in the early 1990s showed that Muslim leaders and youth 
had a radically different understanding of the state and the functions of politi-
cal organization. However, it is clear that the Muslims alarmed their Christian 
neighbors when they appropriated the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as 
their own, assigning to themselves the role of the new state’s “core” group. Nor 
was this surprising, if one accepts the ideas of Samuel Huntington regarding 
the discrete nature of religiously-based civilizations.10
The political structure and ethnic segregation of Bosnia was the result of its 
singular history. After the collapse of the medieval Christian kingdom, Bosnia 
ceased to exist as a political community with an autochthonous and indepen-
Council), while the name for the Serbian militia was “Vojska Republike Srpske - VRS” (Army of 
Republika Srpska).
9 For discussions of “Serbian hegemony” – the tendency for Serbs to appropriate the levers 
of political, economic, military, and financial power in the former Yugoslavia -- and its 
negative ramifications, see the pro-Serbian apology by Alex DRAGNICH, “The Anatomy of a 
Myth: Serbian Hegemony,” Slavic Review (1991); an analysis of Dragnich’s position by James 
J. SADKOVICH, “Serbian Hegemony Revisited, or Blaming the Perpetrator, not the Victim,” 
Journal of Croatian Studies (1993-94); and a detailed discussion of the roots of the ethnic prob-
lems in Yugoslavia by Ivo BANAC, The National Question in Yugoslavia. Origins, History, Politics, 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1984.
10 Samuel P. HUNTINGTON, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 
New York, Simon and Schuster, 1996.
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dent political life. It became part of the Ottoman Empire and was divided into 
a number of provinces. The evolution of local political and social attitudes was 
therefore strongly influenced by outside factors. This evolution and the prob-
lems it generated are often subsumed under the phrase “national question” or 
analyzed under the rubric “inter-ethnic relations.” The scholarly literature on 
these problems is immense, but it is also unsystematic, and the conclusions 
drawn by their authors are so divergent that it is impossible to find a denomi-
nator common to the range of phenomena discussed as part of the “national 
question.” Indeed, historians, ethnologists, sociologists, and political scientists 
in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and abroad have not even been able to agree on 
precisely what these terms mean. Nonetheless, there are a number of books 
and articles that are useful in trying to understand the problematic history of 
the creation of ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Unfortunately, they vary 
greatly in quality.11
Of these, there is a consensus among scholars that one of the most basic is 
the study by a German historian of Bosnian origin, Srećko Džaja.12 Works by 
Robert Donia are also useful, but his failure to cite Džaja’s work indicates less 
than a thorough knowledge of the literature on the subject, and its absence in 
his works and testimony seriously vitiates the validity of his conclusions.13
Despite the wide range of methodological approaches adopted and conclu-
sions drawn by those who have dealt with the question of ethnicity in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, it is possible tentatively to summarize the problems involved in 
discussing ethnic and national identity, and doing so should help to under-
stand the historical background of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s national communi-
ties. The most obvious conclusion to draw from the various studies is that 
most national communities have their roots in ethnic communities that origi-
nated in pre-modern societies.14 Those ethnic communities served as basis 
for the situational construction of the modern national identities, performing 
the role of their “historical cradle”. Real history of ethnic communities is dis-
regarded and through the work of intelectuals, especialy historians, they were 
transformed into modern nations living in the distant past. Their more or less 
fictious new history now became “Nation’s history” trumpeted through the 
11 Djordje PEJANOVIĆ, Stanovništvo Bosne i Hercegovine (The Population of Bosnia and 
Hercegovina), Beograd 1955.; Dominik MANDIĆ, Etnička povijest Bosne i Hercegovine (A 
History of Ethnicity in Bosnia and Hercegovina), Toronto-Zurich-Roma-Chicago 1982; 
Muhamed HAĐJIJAHIĆ, Od tradicije do identiteta - geneza nacionalnog pitanja bosanskih 
Muslimana (From Tradition to Identity – The Making of Bosnian Muslims), Sarajevo 1974; Mark 
PINSON, ed., The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambridge MA, 1993.
12 Srecko DŽAJA, Konfesionalität und Nationalität Bosniens und der Hercegovina - 
Voremanzipatorische Phase 1463-1804 München 1984, translated as Konfesionalnost i nacional-
nost Bosne i Hercegovine, Sarajevo 1993.
13 R. DONIA and W. LOCKWOOD, The Bosnian Muslims: Class. Ethnicity and Political 
Behavior in a European State, 1978; Robert DONIA, Islam Under the Double Eagle: The Muslims 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1878-1914, New York 1981.  Dr. Donia’s collaboration with J.V.A. 
FINE in Bosnia and Herzegovina - A Tradition Betrayed (New York 1993) cannot be considered 
a serious scholarly work for a number of reasons, not least because of biased rendering of facts.
14 Anthony SMITH, The Ethnic origins of Nations, Oxford 1986.
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educational system and capable of serving very important function, that of 
mass political mobilization. In contemporary societies characterized by mass 
production, mass consumption, and mass politics, the ethnic group writ large 
– the nation — became the fundamental “political vessel” and during the 19th 
century the nation became the core around which modern political realities 
were built.  Throughout Europe, the dominant ethnic group (or Nation) iden-
tified itself with and appropriated State, which then became synonymous with 
the Nation.15
This modern identification of State and Nation emerged gradually, begin-
ning in the 1500s.16  It could occur within the framework of those old, medieval 
states, like England, which managed to control the systems of mass communi-
cation within their borders and adopt modern forms of mass political identity, 
gradually evolving a conservative national identity. Or it could occur through 
more a revolutionary process, as politically fragmented communities of kin-
dred ethnic origins, like the Serbs and Croats, or the various Italic peoples, 
formed alliances, overthrew existing states, and erected their own “national” 
states, like Yugoslavia (the union of “south Slavs”) and Italy (the union of 
“Italian” peoples). While historians broadly agree regarding the steps leading 
to the creation of modern nation states, they are unclear as to why some pre-
modern state entities collapsed in these processes and why new ones emerged. 
They also disagreed regarding the inevitability of the process, the desirability 
of certain variants of nationalism, and the taxonomy of nationalisms.17
Since the end of the 19th century, the pressure of “national problems” in 
Central and Eastern Europe spawned revolutionary and “terrorist” move-
ments, including Mlada Bosna (Young Bosnia), a Serbian-sponsored orga-
nization that triggered World War I by murdering the Austrian Archduke, 
Ferdinand, and Bulgaria’s IMRO (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary 
Organization), which operated in the Ottoman Empire and then in Yugoslavia 
and collaborated in the assassination of King Alexander in 1934.18 Such orga-
15 A. SMITH, op. cit; Eric HOBSBAWM, Nations and Nationalism since 1780, Cambridge 1990. 
Croatian translation: Nacije i nacionalizam, Zagreb 1993. Hagen SCHULTZE, Staat und Nation 
in der europäischen Geschichte, München, Verlag C. H. Beck 1993, Serbian translation: Država i 
nacija u evropskoj istoriji, Beograd 2002.
16 For a discussion of early modern nationalisms, apart from Schultze, op. cit., see Liah 
GREENFELD, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity, Cambridge MA: Harvard UP, 1992, passim.
17 For a discussion of nationalism and a sampling of nationalists, see the introduction and 
excerpts by Mazzini, Mussolini, and Nehru in Hans KOHN, ed., Nationalism. Its Meaning and 
History (Malaga, FL: Drieger Publishing Company, 1982/1965), passim. Kohn was an early theo-
rist of nationalism and distinguished good (“Western”) from bad (“Eastern”) variants. On the 
taxonomy of nationalism see Anthony D. SMITH, Theories of Nationalism, London, Duckworth, 
1971.
18 Such movements could take non-violent forms, e.g., the Yugoslav Committee, which was 
formed during World War I and sought to use diplomatic pressure to destroy Austria-Hungary, 
which ultimately succumbed to military pressure from Italy that coincided with an internal 
political collapse. Although old, the most comprehensive discussion of the Yugoslav Committee 
is Milada PAULOVA, Jugoslavenski Odbor. Povijest jugoslavenske emigracije za svjetskog rata od 
1914 do 1918, Zagreb: Prosvjeta, 1925.
M. ANČIĆ, Society, Ethnicity and Politics in BiH                                                                        God. 36., br. 1., 331.-359. (2004) 
336 337
nizations were integral parts of the drive by Balkan ethnic groups to overthrow 
existing multi-ethnic states and establish their own ethnically homogeneous 
entities. These movements played a major role in the collapse of states estab-
lished and organized on the pre-modern principle of multiethnic kingdoms, 
from Austro-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire in 1918, to Czechoslovakia, 
Yugoslavia, Russia (USSR) in the 1990s. A gaggle of modern nation states has 
emerged in their place, from Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania in the late 1800s, 
to Albania, Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Finland, USSR, Latvia, 
Estonia, Lithuania, Yugoslavia, and Turkey in the early 1900s.  Beginning in 
1989, many of the successor states to pre-modern European empires have 
themselves disintegrated because they still embodied older concepts of 
multiethnic societies, among them Czechoslovakia, which divided into the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia, and Yugoslavia, which fractured into a number 
of states — Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and a rump 
Yugoslavia, itself under pressure owing to large numbers of non-Serbs in 
Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Montenegro.
Historians have observed a certain type of regularity in the process of 
building small nation states out of the ethnic groups, and they have noted var-
ious stages in the evolution of contemporary states, from cultural “revivals” to 
political movements with clearly formulated demands for a distinct territorial 
and state structures.19 However, there is no consensus regarding the process, 
in part because it has not occurred everywhere and has displayed no unifor-
mity in its pace or manner of implementation. Indeed, despite experiencing 
ethnic problems similar to those troubling Central and Eastern Europe, long 
established states organized as “multi-ethnic” political entities have survived 
in Western European, among them Belgium, Switzerland, Spain, and Great 
Britain. Spain has recently decentralized to the point of granting de facto 
independence to its non-Spanish areas, and there are separatist movements 
through the European Union, including pressure by the Scots in Great Britain. 
Government of Great Britain spent much of the century fighting the Irish 
Republican Army to retain Northern Ireland, which the British settled with 
Protestants in the early modern era. Even the United States has also expe-
rienced ethnic revival and even conflict to some extent. But the outcome 
appears to be dependent on a large variety of historical, political, social, and 
cultural factors.
In sum, the “national question” represents a complex system of phenom-
ena and social changes that are typical of modern societies, but linked to 
historical traditions and saturated with forms of collective identity dating 
from pre-modern periods. It is clear that phenomena and changes typical of 
the “national question” played a crucial role in stoking the fires of the 1992 
- 1994 war, even though the war was initially set in motion by the political, 
military, and state organizations controlled by a Serbian leadership headed by 
Slobodan Milošević. So this research paper will attempt to describe the funda-
19 Miroslav HROCH, Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe, New York 2000.
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mental components of the social fabric of Bosnia-Herzegovina with regard to 
this broad framework.
Silent Segregation
Because the Christian kingdom of Bosnia ceased to exist in the 1400s, the 
medieval period appears to have relatively little to do with the emergence of 
modern collective identities in what is now Bosnia-Herzegovina. What was 
left of the spiritual heritage of the medieval Christian kingdom appeared to 
decay and disappear under the new Islamic regimen imposed by the Ottomans 
after 1463. The complex collective identity of the population within the area 
ruled by Bosnia’s medieval kings and bans lost its fundamental political char-
acter after the Ottoman conquest.20 The political and religious framework that 
had defined and preserved a collective identity in the period between the 
12th  and 15th centuries was not replaced by similar autochthonous structures 
appropriate to preserve the existing Bosnian Christian identity as distinct 
from newer Ottoman and Muslim identities.21 It is therefore impossible to 
“apply to Bosnia’s entire history the terms state and people” in a cultural sense, 
since three ethnic identities emerged after 1463. Rather than a global Bosnian 
cultural identity, the geographical categories put forward by Džaja seem most 
appropriate. For Džaja, Bosnia is neither a state nor a people, but an “historical 
landscape” where events occur; a “place of historical synthesis” where civiliza-
tions meet and clash;  and a “melting pot of people and society,” which did not 
realize a homogenous ethnic identification.22
Such an approach is supported by the disappearance of Bosnia’s medieval 
nobility, who, as “good Bošnjani,” were the most important vehicle of Bosnian 
identity in the centuries when the contours of modern Europe first began to 
emerge. Some fled to Croatia and Dalmatia, where they were quickly inte-
grated into local population; some were killed during the fighting in 1463 and 
while fighting the Turks under the banner of the Hungarian-Croatian king; 
and others were integrated into the new Ottoman political, social, and reli-
gious system as “spahije”.23 The last group quickly embraced the new religion 
of Islam, because only in this manner could they preserve their privileged 
social position and participate in the political life of the Ottoman Empire.
Gradually, conversion to Islam, the loss of their own kingdom, and inte-
gration into the Ottoman Empire resulted in the loss of uniquely “Bosnian” 
characteristics in the “good Bošnjani,” including their consciousness of being 
a separate, unique social group. During the initial Ottoman occupation, only 
20 On those questions, see Marko ŠUNJIĆ, Bosna i Venecija (Bosnia and Venice), Sarajevo 
1996, pp. 380 ff.; Mladen ANČIĆ, Jajce. Portret srednjovjekovnoga grada (Jajce. Portrait of 
Medieval City), Split 1999, pp. 29-63.
21 Historical sources from this period use the term “Bošnjani” to describe inhabitants of ter-
ritories ruled by a Bosniana rulers. This is at length described in ŠUNJIĆ, op.cit., pp. 386-8.
22 S. DŽAJA, op. cit., p. 13, footnote 1.
23 ”Spahija” was a professional mounted soldier who financed his services out of the income 
from a plot of land granted him by the Ottoman Sultan.
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one institution with medieval roots and traditions survived intact — the 
Franciscan Province; and only one social group directly linked to medieval 
traditions – the urban Catholic artisans and merchants. So the traditions of 
the Bosnian kingdom were preserved only in these specialized environments 
until the late 17th century mass flight of Catholic merchants and artisans from 
Bosnia-Herzegovina’s urban centers.24 With their leaving, all traces of Bosnia’s 
secular medieval tradition disappeared. Only the Franciscans remained as a 
link to Bosnia’s pre-modern past.
Two extremely important phenomena conditioned the circumstances and 
manner in which collective identities would be built in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
after 1463. The first was the chronic warfare between Christian and Muslim 
states from 1463 to 1699. The constant fighting brought about profound social 
changes, including the creation of military frontiers, or march lands, on both 
side. The second was the introduction of the Ottoman political system and the 
Islamic religion, which altered the administrative procedures in the region, 
reshaped the religious makeup of the area, and changed the customs and 
mores of the people in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The extent of the impact of the war between the Islamic Ottoman empire 
and the Christian European forces can be gauged from the duration of the 
conflicts, which continued for twice as long as the devastating Hundred Years’ 
War between England and France. Hungary, the Habsburg monarchy, and 
Venice bore the brunt of the Christian effort, and the repeated encounters with 
Ottoman forces completely changed the appearance of the area later incor-
porated in the former Yugoslavia. The longevity of the war was attributable 
to its religious nature; in effect, this was a clash of civilizations, and Bosnia-
Herzegovina lay square on the fault line between Islam and Christianity. The 
Ottoman empire was shaped according to Islamic theology, including the idea 
that the fundamental task of the state was the permanent expansion of the 
“land of Islam” (dar al-Islam) into the “land of war” (dar al-harb) — the ter-
ritories of neighboring Christian countries. The conflict was suspended only 
by temporary truces and would end in the 18th century when the Ottoman 
empire resigned itself to accepting certain territorial limits and accommodat-
ing itself to the more powerful European political and diplomatic system.25
The manner in which this war was waged created a systematic chaos that 
distorted the cultures of the region. Retaliatory raids and marauding sorties 
by both sides filled in the time between large-scale campaigns. Borders moved 
regularly, resulting in migrations by both sides. So the medieval political and 
cultural boundaries were obliterated and the early modern frontiers were 
24 Catholic artisans and merchants fled Bosnia’s urban areas during the retreat of the Christian 
army of Prince Eugen of Savoy.  In October and  early November 1697, Savoy’s forces had rav-
aged and laid waste much of Bosnia-Herzegovina, so fears of Turkish reprisals drove this mass 
emigration. For the details, see S. DŽAJA, op. cit., pp. 127 ff.
25 Peter SUGAR, Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule 1354-1804 (A History of East 
Central Europe), Seattle 1993 vol. V, p. 8; M. S. ANDERSON, The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 
1450-1918, London: Longman 1993, pp. 71-3.
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fortified and constantly shifting. The medieval Croatian kingdom, subsumed 
within the lands of the Habsburg empire, lost large chunks of its Eastern terri-
tories. Known as “Turkish Croatia”, these territories fell to the Ottomans at the 
end of the 16th century and were incorporated into the Ottoman march lands 
that later became known as Bosnia and Herzegovina. Consequently, when 
Bosnia-Herzegovina appeared for the first time as a discrete political entity 
in the contemporary era, in 1878, it included large tracts of “Turkish Croatia,” 
and a large Croatian population.
Mass migrations, caused by flight before the ravages of war, emptied large 
areas occupied by the Ottoman Turks. Subsequently, these area were resettled 
with new inhabitants, ethnically and religiously heterogeneous, who arrived 
from the peripheries of previously conquered territory.26  A specific way of 
life, a “border culture,” evolved along the boundary between the two warring 
worlds, characterized by an ethos of violence and plunder, ostensibly in the 
service of exalted religious and political goals.27
The changes caused by the establishment of Ottoman rule in the conquered 
territories were even deeper and more far-reaching. As a religious state whose 
institutions reflected the injunctions found in the Koran, the Ottoman empire 
did not recognize or attribute any importance to the ethnic identity of its 
subjects. However, all subjects were considered to be members of a religious 
group, or millet, and this identity was the basis for their relationship to each 
other and to the Sultan, the Ottoman head of state, who also appropriated the 
title of Caliph, the descent of Muhammad and the leader of Muslims every-
where.28
The organization of life within the religious group (millet) was arranged by 
the millet’s members, and representatives of each religious hierarchy assumed 
the leading role within these semi-autonomous entities. Significantly, religious 
affiliation was not relevant only in the political sphere, but in the cultural as 
well. After the final conquest and the consolidation of the new authorities, 
the political and social life of Bosnia was increasingly ruled according to the 
religious principles, a natural occurrence in a state whose laws were based 
on the Shari’a. The change was most visible in the transformation of existing 
26 For an example, see Milan VASIĆ, “Etnička kretanja u Bosanskoj krajini u XVI vijeku” 
(“Ethnic Movements in Bosnian “Krajina” in the 16th Century”), Godišnjak društva istoričara 
Bosne i Hercegovine (Yearbook of Historical Society of Bosnia and Hercegovina), Sarajevo 1962, 
vol. 13. Vasić’s study is based on Ottoman sources and gives a clear picture of what was going on 
in the newly acquired Ottoman provinces.
27 In his report, p. 112, Dr. Donia states that “there was a lot of violence in the region through 
history but, until the 20th century, only a small portion of that violence could be described as 
violence between national or ethnic groups.” This is misleading, because ethnic violence was 
ideologically masked by the struggle between the two religiously based civilizations, Islam and 
Christiandom, both of which would prove important during the formation of modern nations, 
as religion became the line dividing the Catholic, Orthodox, and Muslim communities.
28 The concept of organizing according to millet is discussed in Hallil INALCIK, The Ottoman 
Empire. The Classical Age 1300-1600, New York, 1973. Translated as Osmansko carstvo. Klasicno 
doba 1300-1600, Beograd 1974.; Josef MATUZ, Das Osmanische Reich, Darmstadt 1985., 
Translated as Osmansko carstvo, Zagreb 1992.
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medieval urban settlements which quickly assumed Ottoman characteristics 
as they became the strongest supporters of the new regime.
Bosnian medieval urban areas had been developed haphazardly with 
ethnically mixed districts, but the new Ottoman towns and cities were segre-
gated, with followers of Islam living in the mahala, the Muslim quarter, which 
invariably centered on a mosque whose minaret was used to call the faithful to 
prayer three times daily. Newly arrived Muslims, together with local converts 
to Islam, rapidly assumed a dominant role in urban life. Their social superior-
ity was reflected in their physical separation from the remaining Christian 
population, which included living in a different area and in a different man-
ner. Their appearance, their food, their house types, their entire way of life 
were distinct.  As a result, a “silent segregation” gradually set in, as the new 
urban mahala developed along religious lines. Where there Muslims, there 
could be no Christians. The latter were restricted to those neighborhoods in 
which they had been living at the time of conquest. Over time, many of these 
would disappear too.29
Segregation by religious affiliation did not apply only to the living, but to 
the dead as well. Cemeteries were separated according to religious denomina-
tion, continuing the mundane separation of different religious groups in daily 
life into the grave. This rigid segregation, a sort of religious apartheid, gener-
ated a system of social relations in which affiliation with a religious group 
became the primary, and only really important, identifying feature for an 
individual. All other forms of social communication were derived from and 
adapted to this confessional allegiance, from clothing to writing. For example, 
a rule was issued in the 17th century defining the colors of clothing to be used 
by Muslims, Christians, and Jews. The rule was based on both secular and reli-
gious authority —  the “high edict of the Emperor and the Shari’a regulations 
[of Islam].” Such rules became customary and were followed by the popula-
tion until the last decades of the 19th century to such a degree that members of 
various religious groups could still be clearly identified according to the color 
of their clothing.30
There were also tacit understandings and customs. An unwritten law 
required Muslims in the Western-most parts of the empire to write their spo-
ken language using Arabic letters, giving rise to a unique Bosnian “arabica” 
whose text was Slavic but whose alphabet was Arabic, a phenomenon simi-
lar to that of Cyrillic, which uses a Greek alphabet to write Slavic languages. 
Until the middle of the 19th century, in both Serbia and Bosnia, the Serbian 
Orthodox Church, and therefore all literate Serbs, used an archaic form of old 
church Slavonic, similar to the language of the first translations of Christian 
texts into Cyrillic during the 9th and 10th centuries. Bosnia’s Catholics also 
29 John ARMSTRONG, Nations before Nationalism, Chapel Hill 1982, p. 124, writes that, “It 
remained for Islam to raise the segmented city to the standard type.”
30 Svetlana BAJIĆ, “Gradski kostim i drustvene promjene” (“Urban Costume and Social 
Changes”), in Urbano biće Bosne i Hercegovine (Urban Essence of Bosnia-Hercegovina), 
Sarajevo 1996, pp. 122 ff.
M. ANČIĆ, Society, Ethnicity and Politics in BiH                                                                        God. 36., br. 1., 331.-359. (2004) 
340 341
used this script, but their texts reflected the current spoken language; and 
the grammatical works written by Bosnia’s Franciscans during the 17th and 
18th centuries set the standard for the Croatian language.31 Most social com-
munication occurred within the framework of a given religious community 
or millet, while one’s confessional affiliation became the cornerstone for one’s 
identity, making Bosnia similar to other environments with similar social 
structure.32
Physical separation of the members of different religious denominations 
into distinct neighborhoods would survive in urban centers, oriental kasaba 
(backwaters), and čaršija (downtown market-places) until industrialization 
initiated the first mass migrations to new industrial centers in the 20th cen-
tury.33 Only then would new integrated neighborhoods arise in a few towns 
like Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Banja Luka. But this was a belated and a slow process, 
owing to the late modernization of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 1921, the region 
had only eleven settlements with more than 5,000 inhabitants. But even these 
towns would eventually become the real centers of social integration only in 
the socialist period, after 1945.
Although it furthered some inter-confessional, and therefore inter-ethnic, 
mixing, there was a downside to modernization and the cultural changes 
engineered by Yugoslavia’s socialist regime. The crude ideological approach 
to social reality adopted by the communists excluded all but the faceless 
individuals comprising the “Yugoslav industrial proletarian” and did its best 
to obliterate historical markers of ethnic identity or class privilege. Medieval 
traditions, ethnic customs, imperial monuments, and anything else that 
might compromise the new Yugoslavia was ignored or hidden. Mixed mar-
riages were encouraged and ethnic identification frowned upon. In Sarajevo’s 
National Theater, the new rulers “painted over with gray paint the beautiful 
gold-plated ornaments and replaced the two-headed eagle Habsburg coat-of-
arms with the symbol of socialist Bosnia — a huge factory, with black smoke 
belching from its smokestack.”34
Rapid implementation of socialism’s goals of “industrialization and electri-
fication” triggered mass migrations from rural to urban areas, forcing the con-
struction of cheap mass housing projects by the state.35 Migration continued 
into the 1980s, despite a grave economic crisis and a shortage of money that 
31 The first grammars of the Croatian language, written by Bartol Kašić and Jakov Mikalja in 
the 17th century in Croatia proper, also took the “Bosnian” dialect as the basis for their “standard 
literal” language. See. Eduard KALE, Hrvatski kulturni i politički identitet (Croatian Cultural and 
Political Identity), Zagreb 1999, 57.
32 ARMSTRONG, op. cit., pp. 119 ff.
33 Ilijas HADŽIBEGOVIĆ, Gradovi u Bosni i Hercegovini 1878-1918 (Towns in Bosnia and 
Hercegovina), Sarajevo 1989. 
34 J.V.A. FINE and R. DONIA, Bosnia and Herzegovina - A Tradition Betrayed, New York 1993, 
p. 146.
35 On this process se Husnija KAMBEROVIĆ, Prema modernom društvu. Bosna i Hercegovina 
od 1945. do 1953. godine (Towards Modern Society. Bosnia-Hercegovina 1945-1953), Tešanj, 
2000.
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made it impossible to provide adequate housing for the new arrivals. So a new 
type of settlement with features typical of rural areas appeared on the outskirts 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s urban areas in the decade preceding the war. Rather 
than the financially strapped state erecting apartment buildings, the newly 
arrived settlers slapped together small houses, helping each as they would 
have in the village. So these displaced villagers created an environment similar 
to the one they were accustomed to in Bosnia’s rural areas — nationally and 
religiously homogenous shanty-towns, each distinct and each ethnically seg-
regated from adjacent neighborhoods. They also obviously brought their rural 
values with them.36 It was this type of “suburban” settlement that led Halilović 
to assume that it would be possible to identify both villages and “parts of 
towns and suburban neighborhoods” according to their ethnic composition. 
The peripheries of Bosnian towns became similar to ethnic neighborhoods in 
American cities during the early 1900s, with one important difference — in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina the economy was not strong enough to override ethnic 
differences and integrate the new arrivals into an urban matrix by providing a 
modicum of social mobility for members of all ethnic groups.
By building new cities where socialist culture dominated, the authorities 
hoped to suppress existing ethnic and class divisions in Yugoslav society and 
promote global integration. Their attempts included efforts to transform the 
institution of marriage and the basic social unit of the family. By stripping 
the country’s clergy of their prerogatives, the authorities gave civil marriage 
a social monopoly. By gutting the religious content of the ceremony, they 
opened the door to more ethnically mixed marriages. And by encouraging a 
new “Yugoslav” identity, the state encouraged marital partnerships across eth-
nic lines. A marriage contract between members of different national groups 
became a “positive example” and conferred an advantage upon couples who 
married across ethnic and religious lines. As a result, during the 1960s and 
1970s, a large percentage of the ruling elite, at least in Bosnia-Hercegovina, 
were members of mixed marriages.
The significance of this change should not be underestimated, because 
mixed marriages either privilege one partner’s ethnic group or obliterate the 
ethnic and religious heritage of both partners. In the early 20th  century, when 
ethnic identifications were strong, marriages that occurred between members 
of different religious or national groups actually caused social disturbances, 
a fact noted by scholars who dealt with Bosnian society.37 Although mixed 
marriages increasingly became the norm among Bosnia-Herzegovina’s rul-
ing and professional classes, they remained almost unthinkable in the towns 
36 No modern scholarly study deals with this sort of problems so the remarks are a part of 
author’s own experience of living in Sarajevo until 1993.
37 DONIA, Islam under Double Eagle, passim.
38 Fear of “strangers,” at times to the point of xenophobia, is a general characteristic of rural 
societies.  See. Henri MENDRAS, Sociétés paysannes, Paris 1976, translated as Seljačka društva, 
Zagreb 1986, pp. 107-128, esp. pp. 223-225.  In the case of Bosnia this general attitude was mag-
nified by religious and ethnic differences.
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and villages of the countryside, where large housing projects were unknown 
and older patterns of settlement endured.38 Even in large cities like Sarajevo 
and Mostar, mixed marriages frequently caused tensions and tragedies within 
families, because the spouse was viewed as an “intruder” to be shunned.
The transformation and modernization of some urban areas under social-
ism occurred within parameters that limited the role and influence they had 
on the social life of the country at large. The impact of urban changes on the 
traditional organization of Yugoslav society was therefore also limited. On the 
eve of the outbreak of war in 1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina was still a rural, agri-
cultural region in which sixty percent of the population lived in rural settle-
ments.39 Save for Sarajevo, which had 500,000 inhabitants, cities like Tuzla, 
Banja Luka, and Mostar did not exceed 150,000 inhabitants. The combined 
population of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s major urban areas, including Sarajevo, 
accounted for only a quarter of the total population of the country. But even 
this is misleading, because it is impossible to determine exactly what part of 
the urban population was first-generation newcomers from rural areas, and 
this is an important caveat, because these people, living on the edges of urban 
life in a literal and figurative sense, preserved in the cities their rural ways of 
life, which included segregation from those who belonged to different ethnic 
groups and religious confessions. It is this phenomenon that leads serious 
historians to distinguish the deagrarization of a population (leaving a rural 
environment) from the deagrarization of a society (losing traits typical of rural 
life), and to note that the process occurs over time, often with a considerable 
delay between leaving the countryside and adapting to the city.40 In short, 
simple population statistics are misleading, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
where society was still largely rural and segregated in the 1980s, even in the 
suburbs of the region’s major urban areas.
The “Yugoslav way to socialism” did cause changes in Yugoslav society 
and promoted the development of a specific socialist culture. By disassociat-
ing itself from the West in 1945, then distancing itself from the East in 1948 
and championing the creation of a nonaligned movement in 1955, Tito made 
Yugoslavia a politically and ideologically autarkic country whose population 
found itself isolated at the same time its nonalignment seemed to open it to 
contact with both camps in the Cold War. In reality, Yugoslavs found it dif-
ficult to communicate with the rest of the world, because autarky had its own 
set of values and its own assumptions, largely shaped by the need of the ruling 
elite – what Milovan Djilas labeled the “new class” — to retain power. This 
was especially true in Bosnia-Herzegovina and can be seen most clearly in 
the domain of international scientific and scholarly communication. In 1982, 
the SCI (Science Citation Index), listed 2,505 papers published in Budapest, 
520 in Zagreb, but only 22 in Sarajevo. Since the ratio of papers published 
39 Husnija KAMBEROVIĆ, “Deagrarizacija i urbanizacija u Bosni i Hercegovini poslije 
Drugoga svjetskog rata” (“Abandonment of the Village and Urbanization in Bosnia and 
Hercegovina after the Second World War”), in Urbano biće Bosne i Hercegovine, op. cit., p. 162.
40 KAMBEROVIĆ, op. cit., p. 164.
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in Budapest and Sarajevo was obviously not 100:1, the most obvious expla-
nation for the disparity is that the members of the academic community in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to a lesser extent, Croatia, had a communications 
problem that reflected the languages in which Yugoslav papers were written 
and the subject matter of the papers, which often had little relevance outside 
Yugoslavia.
Rural settlements and their social environment were much more indicative 
than urban areas of Bosnian society in the last two decades of the 1900s. There, 
attitudes, forms of social organization, and the daily round of life were often 
not much different from what they had been hundreds of years ago. A “silent 
segregation” was characteristic of rural communities, a leftover from the peri-
ods of mass migrations and the millet system. The situation was described by 
Robert Donia. “Villages are most commonly ethnically homogenous although 
some villages are mixed,” he wrote some 20 years ago. “In the latter case,” he 
continued, “ethnic groups are usually segregated into district neighborhoods 
or hamlets.”41 Donia concluded that “national” [ethnic] communities
“tend to constitute distinct social systems superimposed on the same geo-
graphic region. Contact is limited primarily to the economic sector, especially 
among the peasants, and this is reflected in marriage patterns, visiting pat-
terns, communication networks and world views.”42
This picture of ethnic communities living next to, but apart from, one 
another can also be found in the writings of Ivo Andrić, a Nobel laureate in 
literature from former Yugoslavia. Andrić was born and raised in BiH, and 
his writings describe a land in which even time is measured differently by 
the region’s three communities, who divide the day and the years into distinct 
segments unrelated to those of their neighbors. Indeed, Bosnia’s three major 
ethno-religious groups lived in different years and eras – the Catholic Croats 
following the Gregorian calendar, the Orthodox Serbs the older Julian calen-
dar, and the Muslim Bosniaks counting the years after Mohammed’s Hejira.43 
Each group, of course, also had its own religious days, celebrations, rites, and 
seasons.  Even the clergy were distinct – from the legalistic Muslim ulema to 
the married Orthodox priests and the celibate Catholic prelates.
Three Bosnias
The bases of the differences in the collective identities of Bosnia-
Herzegovina’s main ethnic groups go back to the years following the Turkish 
conquest in 1463. Beside the migrations that brought large numbers of people 
to the region from the lands previously occupied by the Turks, especially 
medieval Serbia, state support for Islam helped redefine the identities of the 
41 DONIA and LOCKWOOD, op. cit.
42 DONIA and LOCKWOOD, op. cit.
43 Jacques ATTALI, Histoires du temps, Paris 1982, translated as Povijest vremena, Zagreb 
1992, pp. 10 ff., stresses how the ordering of calendars and measurement of time define societies 
and civilizations, both functions usually the preserve of political authorities.
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local population that remained. The most direct effect of this vast change 
was a prolonged process of Islamization, during which some of the Catholic 
and Orthodox Christians gradually embraced the new faith and the social 
and political customs and attitudes ancillary to it. The Ottomans considered 
it their duty to spread Islam wherever they ruled. So the authorities favored 
conversion to the new faith, which was effectively the “state religion”, as a con-
ditio sine qua non for any form of social advance or political participation. 
However, the Ottoman authorities and local elites were content to let large 
numbers of Christians retain their faith and customs, because non—Muslims 
paid more taxes and were excluded from professional and political life, assur-
ing less competition for existing elites. Today, historians generally agree that 
there were many reasons to convert, among them the perception of Islam as a 
religion of winners.44 What is clear is that the process of Islamization funda-
mentally altered Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The subsequent existence of three socio-religious systems in the same 
region has its roots in the process of Islamization and the creation of a 
millet system. However, what appeared as tolerance was really segregation, 
not unlike that of the Edict of Nantes, which allowed Huguenots in France 
because it was convenient to do so. Moreover, only two of the three systems 
were identified with ethnic groups  — the Catholic Croats and the Orthodox 
Serbs. The Muslims were subjects of the Sultans and members of an inclusive 
religion that had no ethnic or national boundaries in the modern sense of 
these terms.
The historical consequences of the introduction of Islamic civilization was 
the creation of three distinct, and incongruent, collective images of Bosnia as 
members of the three major religious groups came to perceive their environ-
ment and their place within it differently.
The first of these images might be called Catholic Bosnia, a virtual reality that 
harked back to the medieval Bosnian and Croatian kingdoms. This Bosnia was 
nurtured through the institution known as Bosna Srebrna (Silver Bosnia), the 
name given the collective activity of the region’s Franciscans, the only Catholic 
clergy allowed in areas occupied by the Turks. This Bosnia also survived in 
the minds and hearts of those Catholics who remained despite the physical 
destruction of their world, and the subsequent segregation, discrimination, 
and physical abuse attendant on Ottoman rule and the continuous warfare that 
characterized the Bosnian march lands. This Bosnia’s manifestations took the 
forms of stories, myths, and legends – making it something quite different from 
the actual reality of the Ottoman border province. It was a mixture of memory 
and myth that conjured up the Medieval world of  the “noble Bosnians” on one 
hand and integrated those elements of  modernity brought by the Franciscans 
returning from their education abroad on the other.
There was also another virtual Bosnia, that of the recently settled Orthodox 
population who had followed the Ottomans into Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
44 P. F. SUGAR, op. cit; also Colin HEYWOOD, “Bosnia Under Ottoman Rule, 1463-1800,” in 
PINSON et al., The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
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were granted certain privileges by the Sultan in return for populating the 
areas emptied by warfare and flight. This Orthodox or, more precisely, Serbian 
Bosnia also had even less to do with history and current realities than the 
Catholic Bosnia. The source of this Bosnia was the Orthodox hierarchy of 
the Serbian church, which had accompanied Serbian migrants as they moved 
into formerly Croatian and Bosnian lands. In order to root itself in its new 
environment, this Bosnia created legends to explain and justify the creation of 
permanent Serbian communities in areas where neither a Serbian state nor a 
Serbian people had previously existed.
The Bosnia of the area’s Muslims, both immigrants and converted natives, 
was the “real” Bosnia. With the support of Ottoman governmental and mili-
tary authorities, they could repress any opposition to their vision of Bosnia. 
With the support of the ulema, the integration of the Shari’a into civil institu-
tions, and the monopoly of power they enjoyed, the local begs, spahijas, and 
Janissaries could, and did, shape Bosnia to their image of it.45 Only in Bosnia, 
on the boundary between two warring civilizations, could a class of profes-
sional warriors succeed in adapting the Ottoman feudal system to its needs 
and  transforming itself into a local land-owning nobility. They drew strength 
from and resisted control by the imperial government in Istanbul, and they 
gained in strength as the Ottoman government weakened. Their triumph was 
the triumph of the third Bosnia, which finally emerged as that of the new 
“Bosniak,” a neologism that has little to do with the medieval “noble Bosnians” 
or the Ottoman “Bosniak.” This Bosnia’s heterogeneous roots and tendency to 
eclecticism was best illustrated by their use of the Arabic script to write their 
spoken language, which was distinctly Slavic.
Although in a state of latent tension and conflict during the 18th and 19th 
centuries, these three Bosnias usually interacted only when the situation 
became unbearable for Bosnia’s “raya,” the area’s Catholic and Orthodox 
inhabitants. This happened when the imperial government and the local 
Muslim elite jointly or concurrently used their political and economic domi-
nance to overburden the region’s Christians, triggering mass rebellions. These 
uprisings followed a unique pattern and generally ended in widespread and 
vicious ethnic and religious violence. It was just this sort of  violence during 
the uprising of 1875-1878 that was used to rationalize the imposition of a 
protectorate over Bosnia-Herzegovina by the Habsburg monarchy.46 Although 
religious and ethnic affiliation did not always coincide with social and eco-
nomic class – not all Muslims were rich landowners, nor were all Christians 
poor peasants — in moments of crisis, loyalty to one’s religious commu-
nity overrode social status.47 As a result, Bosnia never hosted a genuine social 
45 All were professional warriors, landowners, and, for the most part, city dwellers.
46 See the text by Prof. Dalibor Čepulo, passim.
47 Anthony BLACK, “European and Middle Eastern Views of Hierarchy and Order in the 
Middle Ages: A Comparison,” in Jeffrey DENTON, ed., Orders and Hierarchies in Late Medieval 
and Renaissance Europe, London: Macmillan, 1999., p. 27 ff,, argues that in Islamic societies, 
especially in Ottoman lands, stress was on vertical (religious) rather than on horizontal (class) 
affiliation. If so, the Bosnian case is not that unique.
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movement or political rebellion that integrated all three religious, and, by 
extension, ethnic communities. The mechanisms for joint action across reli-
gious and ethnic lines were simply never created during Ottoman rule. There 
were no political institutions that encouraged the cooperation of  the leaders 
of Bosnia’s major religious groups and so no sense of belonging to a territo-
rial entity. Instead, Muslims remained loyal to the Sultan, Islam, and their own 
interests, while Catholic and Orthodox elites were loyal to their religious and 
linguistic communities which preserved their medieval ethnic identities as 
Croats and Serbs.
Because their ethnic identities were rooted in Catholicism and Orthodoxy, 
Croats and Serbs could not easily absorb Muslims within their ethnic groups. 
Indeed, their religious exclusivity prompted them to reject the Muslims. But 
the Muslim elite was too heterogeneous in origin to conceive of itself as a 
separate collective identity, as opposed to privileged individuals and families. It 
comprised members of at least three distinct groups prior to the 20th century: 
the descendants of settlers from the time immediately after the conquest of 
the land, of Turkish ethnicity; the descendants of local Slavs who had con-
verted to Islam; and refugees who had arrived from Ottoman territories lost 
to the Christians during the 17th century, including  the descendants of Croats, 
Serbs, and Hungarians who had embraced Islam.48
As a result, both the Muslim elite and the lower echelons of Muslim society 
were split by internal tensions and conflicts. Those who had converted most 
recently were in the most awkward position. Prior to the 1600s, contemporary 
reports indicated that many of those who had converted to Islam were vacillat-
ing, effecting a public adherence to the new religions and regime, but secretly 
maintaining the traditions of their Christian ancestors – not unlike the dilem-
ma faced by the conversos in Spain during the same period.49 Throughout the 
1500s century and during the first half of the 1600s, it appears to have been 
common for the Franciscans to christen the children of converted Muslims, 
even though the penalty for doing so was death. “Old” Muslims, mostly of 
Turkish and Albanian origin, were aware of this practice and used derogatory 
terms like including  balija and potur to refer to the recently converted popu-
lation. The practice ended in the second half of the 17th century, as the success 
of the Christian counteroffensive provided an opportunity for lukewarm con-
verts to flee to the newly conquered Christian areas and return to the faith of 
their ancestors. 50 Subsequently, the descendants of those local converts who 
remained within the Ottoman empire earned the status of “old Muslims” and 
were completely integrated into the Muslim religious community.
48 S. DŽAJA, op. cit., pp. 50 ff.
49 D. MANDIĆ, op. cit., pp. 269-287.
50 The last large-scale Ottoman threat was turned aside when the siege of Vienna was lifted 
in 1683.  With two decades, the Christians had re-conquered much of  Hungary and Croatia 
proper, and through the early 1700s, Christian were on the attacks, successfully seizing  and con-
solidating their hold on territories previously conquered by the Turk in a process reminiscent of 
the Spanish reconquista.
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Membership in the Islamic community, acceptance of the values it 
espoused, and loyalty to the Sultan were the cornerstones of Muslim identity 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Their sense of being a collective entity was reinforced 
by the idea that the Muslims of Bosnian pašaluk were unique compared to the 
empire’s other subjects, owing to their social status and privileges —  primari-
ly the right to hereditary holdings – derived from their military service on the 
border. This notion of uniqueness grew in the 1800s, as local Muslims began 
to perceive reforms proposed by the central government as antithetical to the 
true Islamic tradition. This conviction was strengthened in the aftermath of 
successful Christian uprisings in neighboring Serbia and Greece, which were 
beginning to develop their own political identities and institutions. The cre-
ation of new political entities was accompanied by brutal mass expulsions of 
Muslims from the territories of the new Christian states. Disputes between the 
local Muslim elite and central government culminated during the middle of 
the 19th century in a ruthless suppression of dissention in Bosnia by Omer-
paša Latas, further strengthening the feeling of uniqueness among local the 
Muslim population there.
The situation began to change in 1878, with the arrival of the Austrians. 
The new environment provided an opportunity for the two virtual Bosnias to 
try to apply their idea of Bosnia. Their search for a place under the Austrian 
political sun opposed their ideal historic-mythic images of Bosnia to the real 
Muslim Bosnia of the time. As Bosnia modernized and came under increas-
ingly strong European influence, it became vulnerable to the new nationalist 
currents. The example of the creation of the new national states of Germany 
and Italy was particularly strong, as was the appeal of pan-slavism. So the pro-
cess of national emancipation was embraced here, as everywhere else in the 
Balkans. However, it soon became clear that Bosnia and Herzegovina was too 
small an area to contain three opposing views regarding its identity, especially 
since they were based on opposing models of civilization. Due to the simple 
lack of physical space, each of the competing concepts of Bosnia had to claim 
for itself the right to a monopoly over the history and people of the region.51
Conflict had not occurred before 1878, because one group had a monopoly 
of the instruments of coercion. But after 1878 conflict became inevitable as 
the three groups sought to occupy the political vacuum left by the Ottomans. 
Two phenomena characterized this period and defined the direction of 
development in the 20th century. For twenty years, under the administration 
of the historian B. Kállay, the new rulers tried to create a “Bosniak” political 
identity in the province.52 But despite control of Bosnia’s political system and 
the prohibition of the use of ethnic names (Croats and Serbs), the effort to 
build a Bosniak identity failed. Rather than embrace an imposed and arti-
51 It has to be noted here that the modern name of “Bosna i Hercegovina” was coined actually 
only in 1878 in German (Bosnia und Hercegovina), within the process of definition of consti-
tutional status for areas that belonged neither to Austrian nor to Hungarian part of the dualistic 
Monarchy.
52 The period was analyzed in detail by Tomislav KRALJAČIĆ, Kálajev režim u Bosni i 
Hercegovini (Kállay Regime in Bosnia and Hercegovina), Sarajevo 1987.
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ficial Bosniak identity, Bosnia’s Croats and Serbs fought for religious and 
educational autonomy, that is, for the opportunity to develop their collective 
identities. Even the Muslims, who had been expected to provide the main sup-
port for the effort to create a Bosniak identity, demurred, preferring to iden-
tify themselves as Croats or Serbs or Muslims. Rather than a Bosniak people, 
during the first decade of the 1900s, Bosnia’s ethnic groups created political 
organizations designed to further the interests of specific ethnic and religious 
groups.53 Following Bosnia’s annexation by the Dual Monarchy, elections for 
the area’s first parliament clearly showed that the population favored those 
political organizations that articulated the interests of the region’s main reli-
gious and national groups.54
Although both Croats and Serbs claimed the Muslims as members of their 
ethnic groups, there was an important distinction between the Croatian and 
Serbian national parties on the one hand, and the political organizations of 
the Muslims on the other. This distinction manifested itself in qualitatively 
different demands and might be considered a typological distinction stem-
ming from the fundamental differences in the formation of the collective 
identity of each of these communities. Using some of Dr. Donia’s findings, 
Mark Pinson recently described a crucial distinction between the develop-
ment of Slavic and Muslim national identities.55 He saw the Bosnian Muslims 
as diverging from the pattern of national revivals undergone by other small 
nations in East-Central Europe, simply because they lacked an ethnic state 
with which to identity and a pre-existing national culture that could form the 
basis for such a revival. The only identifications of Bosnia’s Muslims were with 
the Ottomans and Islam.
“Bosnian Muslims,” he argued, “had no ‘Greater X’ myth [e.g., the Greek 
Megale Idea, Velika B’lgaria, or Buyuk Turkye] suggesting or dictating bor-
ders, which in other cases in Eastern Europe were often as generous as they 
were vague. This absence of an earlier prototypical state with borders that 
had enjoyed at least some kind of recognition might have contributed in later 
periods to anxiety over recognition of boundaries and border areas.”56
He defined this process among Bosnia’s Muslims not as a national revival, 
but rather as a “political awakening.” Pinson’s typological distinction means 
that Muslim political organizations in the 20th century can be best described 
as religious political parties (the closest counterpart would be the Islamic par-
53 DONIA, Bosnia under Double Eagle, passim, described in detail the creation of the Muslim 
political organization. The scholarly literature on early political organizations of Bosnian Croats 
and Serbs is enormous and without exception in Croatian or Serbian language.  
54 In 1878 Austro-Hungary received a mandate to occupy the Turkish province in order to 
pacify it and to establish some kind of provisional conduct of local affairs. After thirty years 
of occupation, the status of Bosnia-Hercegovina changed in 1908 with the unilateral Act of 
Annexation by the Austro-Hungarian Government. After this, the province was no longer even 
under the nominal sovereignty of the Sultan.
55 Mark PINSON, “The Muslims of Bosnia-Hercegovina Under Austro-Hungarian Rule, 
1878-1918,” in PINSON, et al., The Muslims of Bosnia-Hercegovina, p. 89 ff.
56 PINSON, op. cit., p. 91.
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ties in today’s Turkey) rather than as national (nationalist) parties. In politi-
cal terms, this means that while Bosnia’s Croats and Serbs sought to create a 
state based on ethnic identity, its Muslims wanted to build a society and state 
grounded on Islam. But these distinctions were of only minor importance in 
practical terms. The pretensions of  the competing ethnic communities to the 
same territory were mutually exclusive and generated conflict. Similarly, any 
attempt to build an Islamic state and society in an area where the adherents 
of other religions lived was also exclusionary and likely to provoke conflict. In 
short, while Muslim nationalism was distinct in being religious, not ethnic, it 
was not less likely than Croatian or Serbian nationalism to generate conflict 
because its view of the world was as parochial and its goals as exclusionary as 
those of ethnically-based movements.
Regardless of the typological differences between “national” and “Islamic” 
political parties, from 1911 to 1997, ethnically and religiously based parties 
won the vast majority of the votes cast in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the excep-
tions of those periods when such parties were banned.57 In other words, it is 
clear that Bosnia’s people were divided along ethnic and religious lines. So 
long as Bosnia-Herzegovina was a province within a larger political structure, 
the potential for violent conflict was contained as each group jockeyed for 
power, position, and influence within a larger political space. But any relax-
ation of constraints and the disappearance of existing systems for relatively 
peaceful resolutions of social conflicts threatened to unleash the bitterness 
underlying Bosnia’s segregated, competing religious groups.
The breakup of any larger political entity within which Bosnia functioned 
more or less as an autonomous province, has repeatedly led to explosions of 
violence that have spiraled out of control. This was the case in both World 
Wars, especially World War II. After Yugoslavia’s military collapse in 1941, the 
Axis occupiers and newly formed Croatian state could not contain the vio-
lence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was stoked by ethnic animosity, by a rac-
ist Nazi occupying force, and by an Allied policy which sought to turn Bosnia 
into a battlefield to disrupt Axis supply lines to the Mediterranean and Aegean 
and siphon off Axis troops from other theaters. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 
result was the transformation of peacetime political disputes into a bloody 
internal war. Although the reasons for their actions varied, a large number of 
individuals from all three national/religious communities eventually joined 
in the violence, attempting to physically eliminate members of other ethnic/
religious groups and finally realize their own image of Bosnia.
Such behavior can be attributed to the failure of Bosnia’s political elite to 
build the mechanisms and procedures needed to resolve their conflicts with-
out appealing to an outside power, whether the Ottoman Sultan in Istanbul, 
57 National parties were banned by king Alexander in 1929. The ban was lifted in 1937, but 
the region was then divided between Serb and Croat in 1939. During the war, there were no par-
liamentary elections, and after 1945, ethnic and religious parties were again banned. Only after 
1990 were they able to operate openly. In effect, given the corruption of Yugoslav elections prior 
to 1929, there had never been a truly free election in the region before 1990.
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the Austrian Emperor in Vienna, or the Communist dictator Tito in Belgrade. 
Historically, arbitration and pressure from larger and more powerful state 
institutions, not some inbred tendency to toleration, had ensured the illu-
sion of stability and tolerance by assuring the dominance of one group at the 
expense of all others. This preserved a given political system and its elite in 
the short run, but it created deep, unresolved, and largely irresolvable, tensions 
in the long run. In short, it created the preconditions for internal wars once 
restraints were removed, as the repressed groups sought to “settle the score” 
and establish themselves as the dominant group in Bosnia.
Given this analysis, it is clear that some of the conclusions popular among 
the modern scholars need to be reconsidered and largely rejected. It is cer-
tainly correct that “ancient tribal hatred” did not cause the war in Bosnia, but 
it is also undoubtedly an error when someone describes Bosnian society as 
some sort of multi-ethnic idyll. In reality, smoldering inter-ethnic and inter-
religious conflicts had always burned up a certain amount of social energy, 
and they could not be resolved by the Bosnians themselves. Similarly unten-
able is very popular assertion that inter-ethnic conflicts in Bosnia tended to 
break out because they were instigated by an outside factor. Certainly, outside 
factors meddled in Bosnian politics, but they could only make latent conflict 
actual. The real role of outside actors, which in almost all cases was a higher 
state authority exercising sovereignty over the region, was to control and 
exploit conflict by preserving the potential for violence, creating room for 
arbitration and the preservation of their own political domination. In effect, 
they stoked the embers of ethnic competition, but kept it from bursting into 
flame. The highly-charged political environment that resulted lasted for over 
120 years. It burst into flames between 1992 and 1995, as the region’s ethnic 
and religious groups struggled to establish themselves as distinct territorial 
entities and realize their competing visions of Bosnia.
In the Wake of the Flood
The events which led Bosnia’s political organizations to press their national 
claims to sovereignty are obvious in hindsight. They involved the collapse of 
the old world order, an event that created both international and domestic 
political vacuums. The Serbs were the first to perceive the collapse of the 
existing order, which also threatened to dissolve Yugoslavia, as an opportunity 
to resolve the “Serbian question” by creating a Greater Serbia on Yugoslavia’s 
ruins. Serbian politicians manipulated potential inter-ethnic disputes and 
revivified old conflicts in an effort to mobilize Yugoslavia’s Serbs. The first 
notable effort to do so was the SANU Memorandum of 1986. Their final goal 
was to seize large tracts of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the support 
of and assistance from the JNA. Their problem was that it was difficult to 
move from their avowed role as champions of Yugoslavia to their actual goal 
of creating a Greater Serbia. Unable to do both, they opted for the former dur-
ing their attack on Slovenia, and attempted to cloak aggression as a defensive 
reaction in their war on Croatia. Unable to pursue their goal openly, they lost 
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the opportunity to consolidate their gains in 1991. After 1992, they sought 
to secure their gains in Croatia by occupying and cleansing 70% of  Bosnia-
Herzegovina, even though they accounted for only a third of the population 
there. Such a demand might seem presumptuous, until it is recalled that they 
demanded a third of Croatia, even though Serbs were only 12% of the prewar 
population there. The atrocities they committed in the attempt to realize their 
goals compromised whatever legitimate demands the Serbs had to self-deter-
mination in these areas.
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of Europe’s other socialist states 
opened the way to war in Yugoslavia. In Kosovo and Vojvodina, mobs organized 
by Serbian leaders forced the elected authorities to resign and then proclaimed 
the annexation of these formerly autonomous provinces to Serbia, thereby 
overturning the 1974 constitution and fatally compromising the authority of 
the federal government. The same procedure was used in the Federal Republic 
of Montenegro, where a candidate acceptable to Serbia’s leaders was levered 
into office. These small coups d’etat were engineered and staged by the Serbian 
government with the support of federal agencies and the JNA. Ideologically, 
they reflected the goals of  an exacerbated Serbian nationalism. Their primary 
objective was to preclude democratic reforms that might lead to a confederal 
reordering of the state and a multi-ethnic and multi-party parliamentary sys-
tem in which the Serbs would lose their ability to dominate Yugoslav politics. 
With the support of the JNA, control of the federal banking system, and the 
ability to manipulate such political institutions as the police and the media in 
Montenegro, Serbia, and the autonomous provinces, Serbian leaders hoped 
to be able to suppress growing demands for democratic reforms. Republics 
where Serbs were in a distinct minority and had to compete with nationalist 
movements that controlled the levers of power and had the support of the 
majority of citizens, were more problematic for Belgrade’s leaders, who sought 
to incite separatist rebellions rather than orchestrate coups d’etat. In Slovenia, 
Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina, non-Serbian communist elites 
opted to work with those promoting democratic reform. Their decision to do 
so checked Serbian ambitions and led to the dissolution of Yugoslavia’s League 
of Communists, which no longer had a function. The divergent paths pursued 
by Serbian leaders, who sought to hold together a centralized state under their 
control, and leaders in other republics, who preferred a reorganization of the 
state on a confederal basis, was paralysis of the country’s federal institutions, 
as Serbian leaders used their control of the federal banking system to embez-
zle billions of dinars, their seats on the collective Presidency to block access 
to power by other nationalities, and their influence with the JNA to browbeat 
political leaders from other republics.
The political crisis was accompanied by a rapid deterioration and col-
lapse of communist ideology and socialist practice. Because the phenomena 
were interdependent, there is no easy way to trace cause and effect. Changes 
seemed to be sudden and unexpected, and for those who had grown up dur-
ing the Tito era of forced “brotherhood and unity,” often unreal and grotesque. 
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Overnight, criminals and political dissidents emerged from the country’s 
jails to became the leaders of mass national movements and special forces. So 
topsy-turvy did the world become that having been in prison or ostracized 
as a dissent seemed to be necessary credentials for political success. Even 
those prosecuted for embezzlement and fraud, like Radovan Karadžić and 
Mate Boban, emerged as political leaders, claiming to have been the victims 
of political repression. Structural reforms designed to introduce a market 
economy merely destroyed the older system and paved the way for a anarchic 
capitalism reminiscent of the roaring nineties, in which success was directly 
proportional to lack of scruples. Large and once profitable factories failed, 
throwing tens of thousands of people out of work. Destitute, they saw petty 
officials, peddlers, and criminals transformed into owners of large companies 
and, touted by the media, buy their way into government.58
The collapse of the party state seemed to free Yugoslavia’s media. But they 
lacked both a professional ethos and secure financial support. So they quickly 
came under the control of the new political elites, who used them to mobilize 
their respective communities.59 As the existing political system collapsed, so 
did the ideology and values associated with it as the Yugoslav view of the 
world, their Weltanschauung, was shattered, creating a vacuum that was filled 
by older ethnic and religious models of reality. It was both natural and under-
standable for people to turn to religious images and national myths from ear-
lier eras for security. In Bosnia, this led to an effort to reconstitute the three 
legendary Bosnias that forty-five years of socialism had driven underground, 
but never managed to obliterate completely.
It is still to early for a definitive study on the dissolution of Yugoslavia, 
because we do not yet have access to the original and primary documents nec-
essary to reconstruct the period analytically. Nor do we have the monographs 
needed to provided conceptual models and detailed analyses of key questions. 
What we do have is official documents intended for publication, often to 
rationalize a policy or mislead the general public; memoirs and first-person 
accounts by journalists, diplomats, and others whose credibility is as suspect 
as their memories; accounts in the media, which at best are second and third 
hand reports and analyses; and fragments of self-interested testimony by vari-
ous participants.
The nature of our current data base makes it difficult to understand such 
phenomena as how the new national elites were created, to what extent they 
relied on existing networks, and to what extent they were merely a continu-
ation of the old communist elite. It is also difficult to discern to what extent 
they actually controlled events and identify the mechanisms they could use 
58 For example, Fikret Abdić was involved in a major financial scandal; Željko Ražnjatović 
rose to a powerful position in Serbia, despite being on Interpol’s list of criminals; and Alija 
Delimustafić apparently “bought” the post of Minister of the Interior in the Bosnian govern-
ment in 1990.
59 Although biased, Mark Thompson’s Forging War, The Media in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-
Hercegovina, London 1994, is the only survey of the media in Yugoslavia during the early 
1990s.
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to counter challenges to their power and discipline the lower levels of their 
parties and movements. In order to answer similar questions regarding the 
emergence of Muslim political organizations during the late 1800s and early 
1900s, Robert Donia had to read and analyze hundreds of confidential police 
files, newspaper articles, and private letters from the period.60 So it seems 
absurd for the same author to rely on a few newspaper articles and chose a 
single event (the alleged ultimatum by the HVO in April 1993, pp. 41-4) as the 
key to the Muslim-Croat clashes in Central Bosnia. The most a serious histo-
rian could offer at this point in time is a general outline of events, constructed 
from the fragmentary evidence enumerated above, and seriously tainted by 
personal perception and experience, including his own.
Among the phenomena which Donia fails to discuss is the crucial one of 
choosing Bosnia’s coat-of-arms in 1990. As a historian, I personally partici-
pated in this decision and came to appreciate the intolerance and ignorance 
of basic democratic procedures of those in Bosnia’s new political elite. I was 
invited to participate in the work of a commission formed to propose the new 
coat-of-arms, which would become Bosnia’s official symbol. I was told that the 
commission had been formed by the Bosnian Assembly, whereas in fact it was 
convened and controlled by single political party, the SDA. When I expressed 
surprise that there were no Serbian historians on the commission, I was told 
that they had refused to participate. This was true, but I was not told the rea-
son for the refusal – their objection to working on a commission convened by 
a party rather than the parliament. Their reservations were borne out when it 
came time to adopt a proposal for the new coat-of-arms. Instead of seeking 
consensus among all ethnic groups, which would have appeared basic if one 
wanted to build loyalty to the new state simbol, the SDA simply imposed its 
will by manipulating the commission.
Because symbols played such an important role in ethnic identification 
in Bosnia, this cavalier and partisan approach was potentially disastrous. 
Symbols were closely identified with particular ethnic and religious groups 
and therefore crucial forms of social communication. This was true not only 
for Bosnia’s coat-of-arms, but for everyday language as well. When Muslims 
became to use archaic words and expressions of Turkish origin and to pro-
claim them characteristic of the “Bosnian language,” they inevitably alienated 
those Croats and Serbs who considered these words and expressions symbols 
of  the enslavement of their ancestors by the Ottomans. Even everyday greet-
ings became means of religious and ethnic identification, for example, the 
greeting dobar dan, a literal translation of the German guten Tag, introduced 
by Habsburg officials in 1878. This greeting was standard in Serbo-Croatian 
grammars and used throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina until 1992. But many 
viewed dobar dan as a symbol of an older era, associated with the Habsburgs 
and a hybrid Serbo-Croatian language that privileged the ekavian dialect. So 
various forms of archaic religious greetings replaced it, even though most peo-
ple were not practicing believers. Muslims adopted the Islamic selam alejkum-
60 DONIA, op. cit. (1981), for a more scholarly approach than his testimony.
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alejkumu selam; Serbs, pomoz bog-bog ti pomogao; and Croats hvaljen Isus-na 
vijeke, or simply bog. Such changes, although apparently trivial, were as crucial 
as the adoption of tu in place of vous during the French Revolution or tova-
rishch in place of gospodin during the Russian. But in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
they did not denote a shift in class consciousness; they signaled identification 
with a national community, defined historically as descendents of specific 
ethnic or religious community.
Archaic markers of affiliation with a certain community began to reemerge 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the such mundane things as dress and food. One 
of the most obvious was the increasing use by Muslim women of the veil and 
kerchief (zar or feredža), which urban women of all religions had worn until 
1878. Such attempts to demonstrate one’s affiliation often appeared incongru-
ous when they occurred side-by-side with modern technology. For example, 
after 1990 the acronyms of the political parties, and national and religious 
symbols appeared along Bosnia-Herzegovina’s roads on signs whose colors 
mimicked traffic signs, as local settlements began to mark their territory. 
Something similar happened with license plates, as ethnic groups, including 
those displaced by the war, used different symbols for the same area. At one 
point, Jajce had a Bosniak-Muslim plate and a Croatian, both issued by their 
respective administrations in exile, and a Serbian, issued after the Serbs took 
Jajce in 1992.
Affiliation with one’s national community was manifested by the use of 
symbols, which also reassured people whose lives had been turned upside 
down by rapid and profound social, political, and economic changes. The 
media, who shaped the perceptions of most people, exploited such symbols. 
This was to be expected, because in the aftermath of the collapse of socialism 
and Yugoslavia, only collective national identities remained as viable building 
blocks for a new social system. Unable to depend on the state, people turned 
to political movements and parties organized on ethnic and religious lines. 
But because such organizations were mutually exclusive, people quickly came 
to view other symbols and members of other communities as threats – a result 
of collective memory and chaos as much as a product of the media and any 
given political elite.
How this groping for security in ethnic identity led to ethnic violence can 
be understood from an incident that occurred in Sarajevo on 1 March 92, a 
month before the outbreak of  war on April 4. The incident began when a 
group of guests at a Serb wedding arrived in the Baščarsija, an old, tradition-
ally Muslim, part of the city where old crafts were concentrated.61 After 1990, 
it was regarded as a symbol of the Ottoman golden age. But it also had the 
oldest Serb-Orthodox church in town.62 Why the newlyweds had chosen this 
61 According to the 1991 census, community of the Stari grad (Old city), which included 
Bascarsija, was 77% Muslim and only 10% Serb.
62 The church was built in the 1500s, when the town was just beginning to expand and still 
had an important Serbian mahala. See Mladen ANČIĆ, “Razvoj srednjovjekovnog naseobin-
skog kompleksa na mjestu danasnjeg Sarajeva” (“The Development of a Medieval Settlement 
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Complex on the Site of Modern Sarajevo”), in: Idem, Na rubu Zapada. Tri stoljeća srednjo-
vjekovne Bosne (On the Verge of the West. Three centuries of Medieval Bosnia), Zagreb 2001.
63 For the impact of myth on Serb political behavior, see Miodrag POPOVIĆ, Vidovdan i 
časni krst. Ogled iz književne arheologije (Feast of St. Vitus Day and the Holy Cross. Study of the 
Literary Archeology), Beograd 1977.
particular church to celebrate their marriage is not clear. But, given the degree 
of ethnic hostility in Sarajevo, it could be seen as a provocation, all the more so 
because the long motorcade included a large number of Serbian national and 
religious symbols. Such wedding processions were routinely accompanied by 
honking of car horns and discharging firearms in much of Yugoslavia, and 
the noise drew many onlookers. As the motorcade moved into a parking lot, a 
man got out of the lead car and, as was customary, started waving the Serbian 
flag he was carrying. His actions evidently was perceived as a provocation 
by two of the onlookers, who would later attain  the status of heroes and a 
defenders of Bosnia by their exploits. One of them pulled out a revolver and 
shot the man with the flag, then melted into the crowd, perhaps an indication 
that the other onlookers were too stunned to react, or that they were indif-
ferent to the shooting of a Serb in their neighborhood. The shooting trans-
formed the celebrations into a tragedy and triggered a Serbian reaction. That 
night, members of Serbian paramilitary units, supported by the JNA, erected 
blockades throughout Sarajevo, cutting the city in half.
In later analyses, local media, both Serbian and Muslim, tended to point 
to this incident as the spark that triggered the war. To some extent, this was 
an accurate assessment in that this was one of many  possible triggers for 
an internal war whose preconditions had long existed. The murder showed 
that previously routine behavior (displaying national symbols at a wedding 
celebration) had assumed a new meaning (provocation by an ethnic group) 
as ethnic tensions increased. Just a few years earlier, the incident could not 
have occurred, because the wedding guests would have gone to a municipal 
building where part of the ceremony would have been performed, and merry-
making and toasts would have included passers-by. But now, the wedding had 
become a Serbian event, not a civil compact with some religious and ethnic 
overtones. So it could trigger latent ethnic hostility. The rapidity with which 
Serbian paramilitary groups and the JNA reacted showed that the Serbs were 
waiting for just such an incident to act. The emotional charge of the incident 
was strong on both sides because a Serb wedding procession, displaying Serb 
symbols, on its way to the oldest Serb church in Sarajevo was stopped by a 
Muslim bullet. Depending on one’s affiliation, this was either an unprovoked 
attack by a Muslim extremist or an understandable reaction to a arrogant Serb 
provocation.
Had armed hostilities broken out on March 1, they would not have been 
caused because the Serbs, inclined towards myths and epic literature that 
exalted extreme male images and violence, were chaffing to avenge the mur-
der of a single Serb wedding guest.63 The reasons and real motives went much 
deeper, and it is clear that Bosnia’s Serbs were psychologically mobilized for 
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64 The barbaric violence of Serb paramilitary units employed during the wars in Croatia and 
Bosnia-Hercegovina, reported by almost all independent sources, was closely connected with 
the nature of Serbia’s national mythology (see preceding footnote). However, the Serbian media 
the Serbian government and political establishment also bear responsibility for the manner in 
which the war was waged.
65 Donia argued that Tudjman’s views on Bosnia were the ideological basis for the Muslim-
Croat war. (Report, pp. 34-6.)  But in Nationalism and Contemporary Europe (Boulder CO, 
1981), pp. 113 ff., Tudjman argues for the economic and national unity of Croatia and Bosnia-
Hercegovina, not for the partition of the later. Donia also cited Warren Zimmerman to argue 
that the Croatian President retained those views through 1990. This is, at best, hearsay by a 
diplomat whose failed policies desperately needed a scapegoat. In April 1992, Tudjman and 
Izetbegovic signed a letter of intent pledging their countries to cooperate, and two years later 
they formed a confederation. Tudjman did not advocated Bosnia’s partition nor the forcible 
recreation of the Croatian Banovina. He did, at least publicly, advocated something quite oppo-
site, that is cooperation with Bosnia, while at the same time was just waiting to see what will 
come out of the actions taken by “international community”. The point is vividly ilustrated in 
the newly published transcript of his talks with the leaders of Bosnian Croats on the November 
17th 1991 [the transcript is published in Ciril RIBIČIČ, Geneza jedne zablude (Making an Error), 
Zagreb-Sarajevo-Idrija 2000, pp. 113-171]. It also must be added that in “Tudjamn’s cabinet” on 
such occassions intersected two different levels of action, one beeing the “international arena”, 
in which he was a “small player” as President of Croatia with enormous influence amog the 
Bosnian Croats, the other one the “Bosnian arena”, where he tried to forge alliances and manipu-
late the events in the manner possible and in concordance with the means at his disposal. 
Something quite different is true of the SDA leader, Alija Izetbegović, who only reluctantly 
cooperated with Croatia, and who publicly called for stronger ties between Bosnia and Islamic 
states, the fact that has to be connected with his wievs stated in the Islamic Declaration, reissued 
in Sarajevo in 1990, where he argued that Muslim states be based on the teachings of  the Ko’ran. 
He has not recanted his ideas, arguing that he need not do so because Muslims are a minority 
in Bosnia-Hercegovina. But with 44% of the population and the highest birth rate in the region, 
they would have been the majority within a generation – this was the argument never openly 
stated.
66 S. HALILOVIĆ, op. cit., p. 166.
the outbreak of war. But no one had foreseen the results of this mobilization 
– a war marked by a level of brutality that was inconceivable in peacetime.64 
The outbreak of the Muslim-Croat conflict and the war crimes committed 
during it cannot be attributed to a Croatian predisposition to violence based 
on myth, nor to the writings and public declarations of  Franjo Tudjman.65 
In fact, as was shown at the beginning of this paper, general Halilović clearly 
intended to defend only Muslims, and as early as end of 1991 the organizer 
of the SDA’s paramilitary organization and  would be Supreme commander 
of the ABH had marked non-Muslim settlements as hostile. Having deter-
mined the main goal of his organization to be the “protection of Muslim people 
(and) preservation of integrity and wholeness of BiH”, the general identified 
the threats to his people and his country in a list of “total enemy forces” com-
piled fifteen months prior to what happened in the village of Ahmići in April 
1993. Among those on the list are the “extremist forces of the HDZ,” which 
he estimated to be “one-to-two brigades strong.”66  Such a small military force 
was a threat to nobody. Moreover, this was the same HDZ that had encour-
aged Croatian voters to support the EU-mandated plebiscite for a sovereign 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Nonetheless, Halilović, and his collaborators in the ABH 
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and SDA, viewed the HDZ – and by extension, Bosnia’s Croats – as “enemies.” 
I myself am unaware of any official or official document issued by the HDZ 
before the end of 1992 that considered “Muslims” or “Bosniaks” or the SDA as 
“enemies.” 
Conclusions
Although Bosnia-Herzegovina was not a land in which ancient tribal 
hatred had led to repeated war and massacres, by 1990, the region did have 
three distinct ethnic and religious communities that competed for preference. 
In the second half of the 19th century, the modern national identities of Croats 
and Serbs were formed, as were, to a lesser extent, that of Bosnia’s Muslims.
Until 1992, when it gained formal recognition as a sovereign state, Bosnia-
Herzegovina had always functioned only as a province of a larger political 
entity, with varying degrees of autonomy. It therefore never developed auto-
chthonous institutions and procedures for the peaceful resolution of political 
and social conflicts across ethnic and religious lines. Such conflicts, unavoid-
able in all societies, were articulated here as conflicts between members of 
national and religious groups. They were both indigenous to the region and 
occasionally instigated by outside political centers, e.g., Vienna and Belgrade. 
But these outside players always resolved the conflicts. As a result, through-
out this past century, the most important role in the political life of BiH was 
played by political forces which sought to protect national and religious rights, 
but operated within a larger national or imperial context.
Given the competition among ethnic and religious groups, the exclusive 
nature of each group’s claims, and the lack of mechanisms to channel and 
resolve conflict, it appears that the outbreak of war in Central Bosnia during 
1993 was almost unavoidable. The political elite of all “warring parties” were 
to a great extent swept along on a tide of uncontrolled events in which latent 
social tensions and conflicts surfaced in a brutal form, even though the blame 
for initiating the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was not equally distributed. The 
largest share of responsibility undoubtedly lay with Serbian political leaders 
who, counting on their initial military superiority, had opened Pandora’s box, 
expecting to win quick and relatively easy victories. Muslim and Croatian 
political leaders had no effective way to stop what was essentially a territorial 
grab by the Serbs, short of force.
Because the Serbs initiated war before the new Bosnian state could be con-
solidated, there was no viable central authority and no cohesive social fabric 
to contain or control violence. Nor, given Halilović’s vision of the PL and 
ABH as Muslim organizations created to defend Muslims, was there a mili-
tary force that would defend all of Bosnia’s ethnic groups. The creation of the 
Croatian Communities of Herzeg-Bosnia and Bosanska Posavina were there-
fore attempts to defend areas in which Croats formed a largely plurality of 
the population and to provide them with a modicum of civil administration, 
functions that Sarajevo and the ABH could not, or would not, undertake.
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Any assessment of the motives and actions of Bosnia’s Croats needs to take 
into consideration two obvious facts: Croats were the smallest national group 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, at the same time lot of them lived adjacent to a state 
whose population was over 80% Croatian. From the second fact stems the 
conclusion that they were naturally pulled toward Croatia, but because they 
were unevenly spread throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, they did not com-
prise a compact mass that could easily be incorporated into Croatia. It was 
therefore in their interest, as well as that of Croatia, for them to cooperate in 
realizing a multi-ethnic Bosnian state friendly to Croatia. But as the small-
est group in Bosnia-Herzegovina, they could not initiate or influence events. 
Instead, they reacted to conflicts and agreements between the larger Serb and 
Muslim communities. With less than 18% of the population, they were simply 
not in a position to undertake political or military initiatives. In other words, 
the preservation and partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina were Serb and Muslim 
prerogatives. The Croats could adjust to either outcome, but they could not 
determine the course of Bosnian politics. So they attempted to cooperate with 
those who would guarantee the preservation of what they saw as Croatian 
rights in Bosnia-Herzegovina.Their position, while not strong, was consist-
ent – too weak to realize their virtual Bosnia, they were content to avoid 
open conflicts and to support a Bosnian state in which the rights of its three 
constituent nationalities were guaranteed. Unfortunately, neither the Muslims 
nor the Serbs initially accepted this position, because both seemed to have the 
ability in 1992 to realize their Bosnias.
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